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Activity-based funding for National Health Service hospitals in England: managers’ experience and expectations

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Abstract

Activity-based funding of hospital services has been introduced progressively since 2003 in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, under the name ‘Payment by Results’ (PbR). It represents a major change from previous funding arrangements based on annual “block” payments for large bundles of services. We interviewed senior local NHS managers about their experience and expectations of the impact of PbR. A high degree of ‘NHS solidarity’ was apparent, and competition between NHS hospitals was muted. PbR has been introduced against a background of numerous other efficiency incentives, and managers did not detect a further PbR-specific boost to efficiency. No impact on care quality, either positive or negative, is yet evident.

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Acknowledgements

The research reported here was funded by a research grant from the Department of Health, London, UK. The authors would like to thank Martin Chalkley, University of Dundee, for his helpful comments. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors alone.

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Correspondence to Jonathan Sussex.

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Sussex, J., Farrar, S. Activity-based funding for National Health Service hospitals in England: managers’ experience and expectations. Eur J Health Econ 10, 197–206 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-008-0119-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-008-0119-0

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